I think it is probably important to direct attention to this post, which contains the only convincing explanation of PRISM I’ve yet seen, including the tiny budget (if it only cost $20m to process everything in Apple, Google, Facebook etc, what do they need all those data centres for), the overt denials, and the denial of any technical backdoor.
Basically, the argument is that PRISM is an innovation in the technology of law rather than the technology of computing, some sort of expedited court order programmed in Lawyer requiring the disclosure of specified data, and perhaps providing for enduring or repeated collection. This would avoid the need to duplicate vast amounts of infrastructure or trawl every damn thing, would stick to the letter of the law, and would help engineers sleep, as it wouldn’t imply creating a vulnerability that could be used by both the NSA and God-knows-who. It would also permit the President and such folk to deny that everyone was being monitored, as of course they are not.
That said, data could be requested on anybody who the court could be convinced was of interest. As the legalities seem quite permissive and anyway the court is a bit of a flexible friend, this means a lot of people. And in an important sense it doesn’t matter. The fact that surveillance is possible is important in itself. Bentham’s panopticon was based on the combination of overt surveillance – the prisoners knew that there was a guard watching them – and covert surveillance – the fact that the prisoners didn’t know at any given moment who the guard might be watching and therefore could not be certain they were not being observed.
The degree to which this was an aim of PRISM must be limited, because it was after all meant to be secret. But it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it’s there.
Something else. I’ve occasionally said that the Great Firewall of China should be seen as a protectionist trade-barrier as much as an instrument of censorship. Huge Chinese Internet companies exist that probably wouldn’t if everyone there used Facebook, Google, etc. Here you see another benefit of it – the Public Security Bureau gets to spy on QQ, but it’s harder for the Americans (or anyone else) to poke around. This may explain why the NSA seems to pick up lots of data from India and much less from KSA or China; you can PRISM for terrorists trying to affect the Indo-Pak nuclear balance and you can’t for Chinese targets.
Borders are always interesting, and this is today’s version.
Iran, of course, does another twist on this. It has a vigorous internal ISP industry, but monopolises international interconnection through a nationalised telco, DCI, that practices serious censorship. However, the same company also sells unfiltered, real Internet connectivity to actors outside Iran, notably in Oman, Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, almost certainly following Iranian foreign policy goals. DCI has even gone so far as to invest heavily in a new Europe-Middle East submarine cable to add capacity and improve quality (notably by taking a shorter route to Europe, and adding path-diversity against Cap’n Bubba and his anchor). Back in 2006, supposedly, the best Internet service in Kabul was in the cybercafe they installed in the Iranian embassy’s cultural centre.
(A starter-for-ten. Has anyone else noticed that the major cloud computing providers, Amazon Web Services, Salesforce/Heroku, Rackspace et al, aren’t mentioned?)
Yahoo! has not joined any program in which we volunteer to share user data with the U.S. government. We do not voluntarily disclose user information. The only disclosures that occur are in response to specific demands. And, when the government does request user data from Yahoo!, we protect our users. We demand that such requests be made through lawful means and for lawful purposes. We fight any requests that we deem unclear, improper, overbroad, or unlawful. We carefully scrutinize each request, respond only when required to do so, and provide the least amount of data possible consistent with the law.
The notion that Yahoo! gives any federal agency vast or unfettered access to our users’ records is categorically false. Of the hundreds of millions of users we serve, an infinitesimal percentage will ever be the subject of a government data collection directive. Where a request for data is received, we require the government to identify in each instance specific users and a specific lawful purpose for which their information is requested. Then, and only then, do our employees evaluate the request and legal requirements in order to respond—or deny—the request.
Yahoo!’s top lawyer, spinning like a top, but basically confirming the notion of PRISM as a surveillance technology implemented in Lawyer.